Disarmament andInternationalSEcurityCommittee

(United Nations General Assembly First Committee)

Study Guide

LETTER FROM THE CHAIRS

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the Disarmament and Security Council !

We are more than happy to be able to simulate one of the most important committees existing today in order to be able to discuss one of the most important global issues occurring globally.

As your chairs, we promise to do our best to bring you a fruitful and efficient committee simulation. We believe that you are resilient delegates that will be able to make the most out of their own experience and, most importantly, have fun while doing just that! Please keep in mind that we are discussing a very crucial issue in our world today and it requires your utmost care and dedication. Remember that you are the leaders of tomorrow! Research as much as you can in order to be able to write the best possible resolution you can throughout the conference.

We believe in you, and we cannot wait to meet you soon.

All the best,

The DISEC, Chairboard

INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAIRS

Head Chair Maya Çoklar

Dear delegates, it’s an honour to chair this committee. DISEC was my first committee when I started MUN’ing and I hope I can make it less stressful for you all. I'm currently studying Labour Economics at Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University and it's really exciting to be back at MUNs. Don't be afraid to speak up and enjoy your MUN :)

Co-Chair Uraz Eroğlu

Wake up delegates, we got a crisis to solve!

My Name is Uraz. and I’m really honoured to be Co-Chairing this committee. I'm currently studying my final grade at Bodrum Anatolian High School. A debater in heart and soul, I am sure you won’t get bored during our time together. I love history, politics, debating and of course MUN. Originally from İstanbul, I moved to Bodrum in 2017 and I have been here since. I Attended my first ever conference, BMKMUN’23, in 2023. And to come back and chair in BMKMUN’24? ‘Tis a delight!

INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE:

The Disarmament and Security Council (DISEC) is the First Committee of the United

Nations General Assembly, established as such with the creation of the United Nations in 1945.

DISEC contains two main bodies that report to it: the Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and

the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Although the CD is not technically a part of the UN, it

still reports to DISEC and its budget is included in that of the UN.

DISEC mainly deals with the broad issues of nuclear weapons and other weapons of

mass destruction, outer space, conventional weapons, regional disarmament and security, other

disarmament measures and international security, and disarmament and security. DISEC has

had a few landmark resolutions, including the very first General Assembly resolution

“Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic

Energy” in 1946.

In addition, DISEC has passed the very first General Assembly resolution that was co-sponsored by all the Member States of the time. This resolution, adopted in 2001, reaffirmed

all resolutions on the situation in Afghanistan and confirmed that the United Nations would play an important role in the country. It also called for the establishment of a transitional administration leading to the formation of a new government.

Keep in mind that all resolutions passed by this committee are non-binding resolutions and must be formatted as recommendations to the 193 nations in the committee. Furthermore, given its direct association with the United Nations General Assembly (being a subsidiary organ as authorised under Article 22), it retains the powers and responsibilities of the General Assembly as outlined in Chapter IV of the Charter of the United Nations, including:

● Article 10

“mak[ing] recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.”

● Article 11

“discuss[ing] any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it...”

● Article 11

“call[ing] the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.”

● Article 14

“recommend[ing] measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation...”

As delegates at BMKMUN’24, you should keep in mind these values of international cooperation and the promotion of world peace as you work to craft solutions to this issue, which is extremely important to the promotion of international security.

Agenda Item A:

*Addressing the nuclear weapons program in North Korea and working towards denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula through diplomatic means.*

Introduction to the topic:

In the intricate geopolitical milieu of East Asia, a paramount concern commands global attention—the nuclear weapons program of North Korea and the imperative to achieve denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. The unabated development and testing of nuclear armaments by North Korea have precipitated heightened regional and international apprehensions, constituting a formidable challenge to the bedrock of global security. This Committee delves into the nuanced intricacies surrounding North Korea's nuclear pursuits, meticulously examining the prospects and challenges attendant to their resolution through diplomatic means. As the international community navigates this intricate terrain, diplomatic endeavours emerge as an indispensable conduit for the cultivation of stability, the consolidation of trust, and the overarching objective of effecting the comprehensive denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.



Key phrases:

Manoeuverable re-enter vehicle (MaRV):

A nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile specially designed to reenter the earth's atmosphere in the terminal portion of the missile's trajectory

Cruise missile:

An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path. There are subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles currently deployed in conventional and nuclear arsenals, while conventional hypersonic cruise missiles are currently in development. These can be launched from the air, submarines, or the ground. Although they carry smaller payloads, travel at slower speeds, and cover lesser ranges than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be programmed to travel along customised flight paths and to evade missile defence systems.

Nuclear weapon:

A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission (fission bomb) or a combination of fission and fusion reactions (thermonuclear bomb), producing a nuclear explosion. Both bomb types release large quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter.

The [first test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trinity_(nuclear_test)) of a fission ("atomic") bomb released an amount of energy approximately equal to 20,000 [tons of TNT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TNT_equivalent) (84 [TJ](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terajoule)). The first thermonuclear ("hydrogen") bomb [test](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivy_Mike) released energy approximately equal to 10 million tons of TNT (42 PJ). Nuclear bombs have had yields between 10 tons TNT (the [W54](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W54)) and 50 megatons for the [Tsar Bomba](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsar_Bomba). A thermonuclear weapon weighing as little as 600 pounds (270 kg) can release energy equal to more than 1.2 megatonnes of TNT (5.0 PJ).

Juche:

Juche is a political ideology developed by Kim Il-sung, the founding leader of North Korea. The term "Juche" translates to "self-reliance" in English. The ideology emphasises the importance of national sovereignty, independence, and self-sufficiency in political, economic, and military matters.

According to Juche, a nation should rely on its own resources and strengths to develop and prosper, without being dependent on external powers. The ideology places a strong emphasis on the role of the leader, and in the case of North Korea, it has been used to justify the leadership of the ruling Kim family.

Juche has been a guiding principle in North Korean political and cultural life since the country's establishment in 1948. It is enshrined in the constitution and is considered the official state ideology of North Korea. The government promotes Juche through various means, including political education, propaganda, and the arts.



Historical Background:

The first recorded kingdom (Choson) on the Korean Peninsula dates from approximately 2300 B.C. Over the subsequent centuries, three main kingdoms - Koguryo, Paekche, and Silla - were established on the Peninsula. By the 5th century A.D., Kogoryo emerged as the most powerful, with control over much of the Peninsula, as well as part of Manchuria (modern-day northeast China). However, Silla allied with the Chinese to create the first unified Korean state in the late 7th century (688). Following the collapse of Silla in the 9th century, Korea was unified under the Koryo (Goryeo; 918-1392) and the Chosen (Joseon; 1392-1910) dynasties. Korea became the object of intense imperialistic rivalry between the Chinese 

(its traditional benefactor), Japanese, and Russian empires in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Korea was occupied by Imperial Japan. In 1910, Japan formally annexed the entire peninsula. After World War II, Korea was split along the 38th parallel with the northern half coming under Soviet-sponsored communist control.

In 1948, North Korea (formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) was founded under President KIM Il Sung, who consolidated power and cemented autocratic one-party rule under the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). After the Korean War (1950-53), during which North Korea failed to conquer UN-backed South Korea (formally the Republic of Korea or ROK), North Korea demonised the US as the ultimate threat to its social system through state-funded propaganda and moulded political, economic, and military policies around the core

ideological objective of eventual unification of Korea under Pyongyang's control.

North Korea also declared a central ideology of *juche* (*"*self-reliance") as an internal check against outside influence while continuing to rely heavily on China and the Soviet Union for economic support. Establishing a policy of hereditary succession in North Korea, KIM Il Sung's son, KIM Jong Il, was officially designated as his father's successor in 1980, assuming a growing political and managerial role until the elder KIM's death in 1994. Under KIM Jong Il's reign, North Korea continued developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

KIM Jong Un was publicly unveiled as his father's successor in 2010. Following KIM Jong Il's death in 2011, KIM Jong Un quickly assumed power and has since occupied the regime's highest political and military posts. After the end of Soviet aid in 1991, North Korea faced serious economic setbacks that exacerbated decades of economic mismanagement and resource misallocation. Since the mid-1990s, North Korea has faced chronic food shortages and economic stagnation. In recent years, the North's domestic agricultural production has improved, but still falls far short of producing sufficient food to provide for its entire population. Starting in 2002, North Korea began to tolerate semi-private markets but has made few other efforts to meet its goal of improving the overall standard of living.

New economic development plans in the 2010s failed to meet government-mandated goals for key industrial sectors, food production, or overall economic performance. At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020, North Korea instituted a nationwide lockdown that severely restricted its economy and international engagement. Since then, leader KIM Jong Un has repeatedly expressed concerns with the regime's economic failures and food problems, but in 2021 vowed to continue "*self-reliant*" policies and has reinvigorated his pursuit of greater regime control of the economy. As of 2023, despite slowly renewing cross-border trade, North Korea remains one of the World's most isolated and one of Asia's poorest countries.

North Korea has a history of provocative regional military actions and posturing that are of major concern to the international community and have limited North Korea’s international engagement, particularly economically. These include proliferation of military-related items; ballistic and cruise missile development and testing; WMD programs including tests of nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017; and large conventional armed forces. Despite high-level efforts to ease tensions during the 2018-19 timeframe, including summits with the leaders of China, South Korea, and the US, North Korea has continued developing its WMD programs and, in recent years, issued statements condemning the US and vowing to further strengthen its military capabilities, including long range missiles and nuclear weapons.

North Korea possesses significant ballistic missile capabilities, and since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been one of the most active proliferators of complete ballistic missile systems, components, and technology. Although initially dependent on foreign assistance, notably from the former Soviet Union and [China](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/china/), the program has become almost completely indigenous in materials and expertise. North Korea has tested a series of different missile types, including short-, medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental- range ballistic missiles, as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

North Korea sees its missile program as both an investment in its security and a means of generating cash. North Korea has sold missile systems and technology to other countries, in spite of United Nations Security Council Resolutions specifically prohibiting such trade. North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Hague Cod.

After several years of frequent ballistic missile tests, on 28 November 2017, North Korea successfully flight-tested the Hwasong-15, an ICBM which it claims is capable of delivering a nuclear weapon anywhere in the [United States](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/united-states/). Shortly afterward, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared that North Korea had “*finally realised the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force, the cause of building a rocket power.*”

A diplomatic thaw followed, during which Kim Jong-un reportedly offered to “stop nuclear tests and launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles” in April 2018. Kim also expressed a desire to meet with then U.S. President Donald Trump, which Trump accepted, and the two leaders subsequently met on 12 June 2018 in Singapore. After a second summit between the two leaders collapsed on 29 February 2019 in Vietnam, North Korea resumed missile tests in May 2019. On 4 May and 9 May 2019, North Korea launched a total of three solid-fueled short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), which were first displayed at a military parade in February 2018.

Early Ballistic Missile Developments:

During the late 1960s, North Korea acquired surface-to-ship missiles and FROG-5/7 rockets from the Soviet Union. By 1970, China was delivering surface-to-ship missiles, SAMs, and technical assistance. 9 In September 1971, North Korea signed an agreement with China to acquire, develop, and produce ballistic missiles and other weapon systems. However, substantial cooperation did not begin until about 1977, when North Korean engineers were able, the development of North Korean human resources was necessary, but not sufficient, for the relatively rapid progress of its missile development program. For many years, North Korea relied upon the transfer of hardware and technology from more advanced producers. North Korea obtained Soviet-made Scud-B missiles to begin a reverse-engineering program, but the timing and source of the procurement are still unclear—the first missiles may have been acquired as early as 1972 from the USSR. 11 The general view, however, is that [Egypt](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/egypt/) provided the first Scud-B missiles to North Korea in 1976, or at some time between 1979 and 1981 to participate in a joint program to develop China’s DF-61. By 1984, North Korea had produced and flight-tested the Hwasong-5, an indigenous version of the Scud-B. In 1985 North Korea reached an agreement with [Iran](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/) to obtain financial assistance for missile development and production in exchange for Iran’s option to purchase North Korean missiles in the future.

Iran’s ballistic missile “war of the cities” with Iraq created an opportunity for North Korea to earn foreign exchange and increase economies of scale in production. Furthermore, Iran’s use of the Hwasong-5 provided North Korea with performance data that would otherwise have required extensive indigenous flight-testing.

From 1985 to 1986, North Korea began to construct missile bases for the Hwasong-5, which entered serial production by 1987. It is believed the production rate peaked at eight to ten missiles per month during 1987 to 1988. As soon as, or shortly after, mass production of the Hwasong-5 began, North Korea began development of the Hwasong-6 (Scud-C), before rapidly starting the [Nodong](https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korean-ballistic-missile-models/#nodong) development program around the 1987 to 1989 timeframe. This prompt sequence of development is remarkable, and historically unprecedented for a small developing country. Late-industrialising countries can reduce the time required for industrialisation, and the same is true in the area of missiles. However, accelerated development is generally a function of foreign technology transfers, so North Korea’s extremely rapid progress in missile development suggests a high level of foreign technical assistance. By the late 1980s, North Korea began construction of medium-range missiles. Around 1990 to 1991, serial production of the Hwasong-6 began, at about the same time that the first [Nodong](https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korean-ballistic-missile-models/#nodong) prototypes were built. Meanwhile, North Korea began to provide technology transfers, and even turnkey Scud factories, to countries in the Middle East.

### Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile(IRBM) Development:

In the late 1980s, North Korea’s Second Natural Science Institute began development of the Nodong (or Rodong) MRBM. North Korea reportedly obtained Nodong sales contracts with [Libya](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/libya/), Iran, and possibly [Syria](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/syria/) and [Pakistan](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/) before successfully flight-testing the Nodong in late May 1993. North Korea began to deploy the Nodong in 1995. As the Nodong’s development neared completion, North Korean engineers began work on the [Taepodong-1](http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korean-ballistic-missile-models/#taepodong1), a three-stage missile with a Nodong as the first stage, a Hwasong (Scud) variant as the second stage, and an unknown, likely solid-fueled third stage. 19 The Taepodong-1 was flight-tested in a space launch configuration on 31 August 1998, but failed to place a small satellite named Kwangmyongsong-1 into earth’s orbit due to the failure of its third stage.

In 2003, U.S. satellite imagery revealed the development of a new North Korean IRBM known as the [Musudan](http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korean-ballistic-missile-models/#musudan) BM-25. The missile was derived from the Soviet R-27 (SS-N-6) liquid-fueled submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), which the Soviets deployed from the 1960s to the 1980s and had a range of up to 2,500km. 21 The Musudan is a mobile, land-based, and liquid-fueled ballistic missile with a length of 12 metres, diameter of 1.5 metres, and a range of 2,500-4,000km.

North Korea displayed the Musudan for the first time in 2007, although no images of the missile were released. In late 2009, leaked U.S. diplomatic cables revealed that North Korea likely exported Musudan missiles to Iran. 23 The Musudan made its public debut in front of the Western press in an October 2010 military parade alongside Kim Jong-un, who made his own international press-debut at the event. The October parade was also notable for unveiling a new Nodong variant with a triconic nose-cone that greatly resembles Iran’s Ghader-1 missile, perhaps hinting at further cooperation.

North Korea did not test the Musudan until 2016. From April to June of 2016, there were six missile tests in quick succession, the first five of which were failures. 25 This rapid testing was unusual for North Korea and did not allow time to troubleshoot, emphasising the political nature of the tests. 26 The sixth Musudan test, however, appeared to have succeeded in flying on a lofted trajectory travelling 400 km in distance while reaching an altitude of 1400 km. 27 Experts believe the missile’s operational range is substantially greater, and that North Korea tested the system at a lofted angle to keep the missile in its own territorial space.

On 5 September 2016, North Korea carried out a simultaneous test of three never-before-seen missiles which landed about 200 km west of [Japan](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/japan/). 29 The missiles were likely Extended Range Scuds (ER Scuds). 30 The ER Scud appears to be slightly larger than the Scuds traditionally employed by the regime; however, the missiles possess almost twice the range. The test took place in the middle of the 2016 G20 Hangzhou Summit and drew a sharp public rebuke from Chinese President Xi Jinping.

On 6 March 2017, North Korea carried out a salvo fire of four ER Scuds into the Sea of Japan. Open-source analysis of the tests indicated that they were intended to simulate a nuclear strike against the U.S. military base at Iwakuni, Japan.

### Intercontinental Ballistic Missile(ICBM) Development:

Beginning in the 1990’s, North Korea acquired essential technical experience for ICBM development from its ostensibly peaceful space launch vehicle program. North Korea flight tested the three-stage Taepodong-1 in 1998, followed by the [Taepodong-2](http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korean-ballistic-missile-models/#taepodong2) in July 2006, both times failing to achieve orbit.

Despite North Korean protests, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1695 on 15 July 2006 in response to the tests, demanding that North Korea suspend all missile-related activities and requiring all UN member states to prevent the transfer of missile-related materials and technologies to North Korea.

On 5 April 2009, North Korea launched an Unha-2 space launch vehicle, a modified version of the Taepodong-2, to place a satellite into orbit. No orbit was detected by outside observers, and the launch was seen as a technical failure. Three years later, in April 2012, North Korea attempted to launch an Unha-3 rocket, which was capable of carrying a larger payload than its predecessor. The launch was a failure, and it was condemned by both the international community and the United States, and precipitated the collapse of the nascent “Leap Day Agreement,” in which North Korea had agreed to suspend nuclear and missile tests in exchange for food aid.

North Korea later successfully tested the [Unha-3](http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korean-ballistic-missile-models/#unha3) rocket twice, on 12 December 2012 and 7 February 2016. The 2016 launch triggered widespread international condemnation and, in conjunction with a January 2016 nuclear test, led to additional sanctions against North Korea. North Korea displayed a new ICBM missile system at a parade shortly after the February test. The new missiles, known externally as the [KN-08](http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/north-korean-ballistic-missile-models/#KN-08) or Hwasong-13, were displayed on six trucks of Chinese origin, which had been converted to transporter-erector-launchers (TELs).

On 12 February 2017, North Korea tested a new missile called the Pukguksong-2. The missile, which travelled approximately 500 km and landed east of North Korea in the Sea of Japan, was the land-based version of the Pukkuksong-1 SLBM. The missile was tested using a cold-launch canister system carried on a tracked TEL, and represented an advance in North Korea’s solid-fueled rocket capabilities. Not only does the Pukguksong-2 missile require minimal logistical support, but it is also more mobile and survivable than a Nodong or Scud missile. The test occurred during then Prime Minister of Japan Shinzō Abe’s visit to the United States to meet with then U.S. President Donald Trump, and U.S. officials noted at the time that the successful test could aid the DPRK’s development of an ICBM.

On the morning of 4 July 2017, North Korea successfully flight-tested its first ICBM, the Hwasong-14, from a field outside the town of [Panghyon](http://www.nti.org/learn/facilities/222/). The missile was fired at a lofted angle, achieving an altitude of approximately 2,800 km before descending into the Sea of Japan, approximately 930 km away. Analyst estimates based on the test indicated that the missile demonstrated a range between 6,700 km and 8,000 km based on if it was launched on a more effective trajectory. The international community condemned the test, and the United States and [South Korea](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/south-korea/) conducted a joint missile exercise in response. North Korea tested the Hwasong-14 a second time on 28 July. The test showed improved performance indicating a projected range of over 10,000 km, according to some analysts.

On 29 November 2017, North Korea announced the successful test of a new ICBM, the Hwasong-15. The missile was tested during a night launch and was said to have reached an altitude of 4,475km and flew 950 km. This suggests that the Hwasong-15 on a standard trajectory would have a range of at least 13,000 km, putting the entire continental United States in range. Images of the missile released by North Korea after the launch show that the Hwasong-15 is larger than the Hwasong-14, and includes a number of technical improvements over its predecessor. The first of the Hwasong-15’s two stages appears to possess a twin-chambered, gimbaled engine, making it substantially more efficient and manoeuvrable. The second stage was noticeably larger than the second stage of the Hwasong-14, possibly indicating a larger engine. After the test, North Korean state media claimed that the country had “*finally realised the great historic cause of completing”*.

Although North Korea has conducted successful tests of both nuclear weapons and ICBMs, there is no expert consensus as to whether North Korea has demonstrated an operational re-entry vehicle, a necessary technology for delivering a nuclear warhead on an ICBM.

### Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) Development:

The North Korean navy maintains one of the world’s largest submarine forces, and has been developing submarine-launched ballistic missile capabilities. In July 2014, open-source analysts spotted a new type of submarine at the Sinpo Shipyard with visible conning towers that might be used to house either ballistic or cruise missiles. On 10 May 2015, North Korea released images of Kim Jong-un observing a test of a Pukkuksong-1 (or Polaris-1) SLBM purportedly launched from a submerged submarine, but later analysis determined that the missile was launched from a submerged barge.

North Korea unveiled a new submarine capable of firing a single ballistic missile in mid-2015, identified later as a Gorae-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN). North Korea is thought to have a single Gorae SSBN and it has not yet proven to be operational. North Korea observers have alleged that the country is building a new SSBN as a successor to the Gorae, called the Sinpo-C class within the U.S. intelligence community. The new Sinpo-C class submarine may feature a wider range and be able to accommodate a more advanced SLBM.

### Missile Exports:

Since the mid-1980’s, North Korea has been an exporter of complete ballistic missile systems to countries throughout the world. Past customers include Egypt, [Iraq](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iraq/), [Syria](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/syria/), [Libya](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/libya/), [Yemen](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/yemen/), Iran, the [UAE](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/united-arab-emirates/), and Pakistan. A series of United Nations Security Council resolutions, unilateral sanctions, and voluntary national associations such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) have curbed North Korea’s missile exports, while having also diminished demand in the Middle East. However, North Korea continues to be a missile exporter in spite of UN sanctions. In February 2018, a report published within the UN asserted that North Korea has illicitly traded missiles and other military technology with [Myanmar](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/myanmar/). The report indicated that Myanmar “received ballistic missile systems from [North Korea] in addition to a range of conventional weapons, including multiple rocket launchers and surface-to-air missiles.”

In other cases, North Korean missile export relationships with other countries have matured into international cooperation and collaboration in ballistic missile development. Notably, Iran imported missile systems from North Korea from the time of the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980’s, and many Iranian ballistic missiles are based on North Korean designs. However, in recent years, the North Korean-Iranian relationship has become more collaborative. For example, North Korea’s solid-fuel Pukguksong missile program bears many technical similarities to missiles and propellant developed in Iran. Iranian experts have reportedly assisted North Korea in its development of rocket boosters for its space-launch vehicle program.

## Recent Developments:

On 20 April 2018, Kim Jong-un reportedly offered to “stop nuclear tests and launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles,” according to KCNA, North Korea’s state-controlled news service. On 9 March 2018, South Korean officials announced that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was “committed to denuclearisation” and wished to meet Then U.S. President Donald Trump. On 12 June 2018, Kim Jong-un and President Trump met at a summit meeting in Singapore, the first ever vis-à-vis meeting between leaders of the U.S. and the DPRK. The two nations agreed to “build a lasting and stable peace regime,” and the DPRK committed to “work toward denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.” However, North Korea made no firm commitments to curtail its missile program at the summit or during subsequent rounds of diplomacy.

North Korea refrained from conducting further missile tests until 4 May and 9 May 2019: 4 May saw the testing of one SRBM, and 9 May saw the testing of two SRBMs. Analysts noted that the SRBM launched on 4 May was similar in design to the [Russian](https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/) Iskander SRBM. The May tests did not violate North Korea’s commitment to cease ICBM and nuclear testing, and the international response, including from the U.S. and South Korea, was relatively muted. The tests appeared to confirm analysis from the U.S. intelligence services and open-source community that North Korea has continued to produce and develop new missiles since its self-imposed ICBM moratorium.

From the resumption of tests until the end of 2019, North Korea conducted 13 missile tests, the majority involving the KN-25 missile, a solid-fueled, short-range ballistic missile with a range of 380 kilometres. Based on imagery analysis, four of these missiles can be transported on and launched from a Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) wheeled vehicle. Militarily, the KN-25 and its “four-shot” TEL show that North Korea has the capability to subject all of South Korea to missile barrages without resorting to single-launched medium-range missiles like the Rodong-1 or Hwasong-7

In October 2020, during the military parade held to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the governing Workers' Party of Korea, previously unseen “massive” long range ballistic missiles were displayed: the Pukguksong 4A submarine-launched missile, and a huge Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) on a launcher vehicle with a colossal eleven axle.

Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North Korea

North Korea is estimated to have assembled [30 nuclear warheads](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB23%2007%20WNF.pdf), as of January 2023, and to have the fissile material for an estimated 50-70 nuclear weapons, as well as advanced chemical and biological weapons programs. In the past several years Pyongyang has accelerated the pace of ballistic missile testing. In 2022, North Korea conducted more than 90 tests of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), land-attack cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), IRBMs and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) according to [SIPRI](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB23%2007%20WNF.pdf). North Korea withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, but its withdrawal is disputed. Beginning in 2006, the UN Security Council has passed several resolutions requiring North Korea to halt its nuclear and missile activities and imposing sanctions on Pyongyang for its refusal to comply.

fissile materials:

* Plutonium

Experts assess that North Korea’s 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests likely used plutonium, which North Korea was known to have produced at weapons-grade levels.

North Korea announced its intention to restart its Yongbyon 5MWe Reactor for plutonium production in April 2013, after disabling it as a part of the six-party talks in 2007. North Korea declared the site to be “[fully operational](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34254634)” by late August 2015.

The reactor can produce [six kg](http://38north.org/2013/09/yongbyon091113/) of weapons-grade plutonium each year when fully operational.

Satellite imagery from April 2016, January 2017, and April 2018 [confirmed](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/27/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear.html) increased activity at the reprocessing site.

As of April 2021, North Korea is [estimated](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-09/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-north-korea-have-in-2022/) to possess 25-48 kg of plutonium.

* Highly Enriched Uranium

While Pyongyang has constructed a gas centrifuge facility, it is unknown if the facility is producing uranium enriched to weapons-grade.

North Korea has declared only one uranium enrichment facility, the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant, which is estimated to have 4,000 centrifuges. However, in 2021, it was estimated that the plant was expanding to include another 1,000 centrifuges.

There is also wide belief within the intelligence community that a second covert plant exists [in Kangson](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-09/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-north-korea-have-in-2022/). In 2022, the United Nations listed Kangson as a “suspected clandestine uranium enrichment facility.”

While the clandestine nature of the North Korean enrichment facilities makes it difficult to estimate, as of 2022, North Korea is [estimated](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-09/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-north-korea-have-in-2022/) to possess [400-1,000](https://thebulletin.org/premium/2022-09/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-north-korea-have-in-2022/) kg of uranium according to the International Panel on Fissile Materials.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

NPT is an international agreement established in 1970 to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It distinguishes between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states, aiming to limit the former's arsenals and promote disarmament. The treaty also recognizes the right of all nations to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Periodic review conferences assess its implementation and address global concerns related to nuclear weapons proliferation and disarmament. The NPT is a key framework for international efforts to maintain security and control the spread of nuclear weapons.

Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) in 1985 as a non-nuclear-weapon state; however, it withdrew from the Treaty in 2003 and began developing nuclear weapons. It is puzzling why North Korea’s policy towards the NPT shifted from compliance to defiance during this period. Understanding the main reasons behind North Korea’s 2003 NPT policy shift could perhaps provide insights into why North Korea wants nuclear weapons today, and thereby inform policymakers about ways of re-engaging North Korea to the denuclearization agenda. The neorealist explanation presumes that the external power balance changed, so North Korea wanted nuclear weapons to deter security threats. The selectorate theory presumes that domestic politics changed, so the regime leader was incentivized to pursue nuclear programs for domestic support.

Historical Background During the Cold War, North Korea faced security threat Pyongyang expelled the IAEA team in 2001 and officially withdrew from the NPT in 2003 Pyongyang’s different response to the 1993 and 2003 nuclear crisis may have been prompted by changes in the international or domestic context, which could be explained through neorealism and the selectorate theory

neo-realistic reason: North Korea withdrew from the NPT because North Korea wanted to acquire nuclear weapons to protect its national security against surrounding nuclear states.

selectorative reason: North Korea withdrew from the NPT because the regime’s leader is incentivized to maintain nuclear programs to provide private benefits to his winning coalition

United Nations Resolutions regarding or related to DPRK

Security Council Resolution 1718

Resolution 1718 was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council on October 14, 2006, shortly after North Korea’s first nuclear test on October 9.

Resolution 1718’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 1718:

● Demands North Korea refrain from further nuclear or missile tests.

● Demands North Korea return to the NPT.

● Decides North Korea shall suspend all ballistic missile activities.

● Decides North Korea shall abandon its nuclear program in a “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” manner.

● Decides North Korea shall abandon all WMD activities.

● Calls upon North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks.

Resolution 1718’s Principal Sanctions

Member states are prohibited from the “direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer” to North Korea, of:

● Heavy weaponry, such as tanks, armoured vehicles, large calibre artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missile systems

● Spare parts for the above mentioned heavy weaponry

● Materials and technologies that could contribute to North Korea’s WMD programs and ballistic missile related activities, as set out in prior Security Council documents

● Luxury goods

Member states are also required to:

● Freeze the funds or financial assets of entities designated by the Security Council as providing support for North Korea’s nuclear, missile, and other WMD programs

Resolution 1718’s Monitoring Mechanisms

The resolution established a committee composed of the 15 current members of the Security Council to function as a monitoring body to review and adjust the imposed sanctions and violations of the sanctions. The body was to provide a report on the status of sanctions implementation every 90 days.

Security Council Resolution 1874

Resolution 1874 was unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council on June 12, 2009, shortly after North Korea’s second nuclear test, which took place May 25. Resolution 1874’s Principal Provisions

The resolution reiterated a number of provisions from Resolution 1718. It also called upon North Korea to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Resolution 1874’s Principal Sanctions

Sanctions in Resolution 1874 built off several measures first laid out in Resolution 1718. The resolution expanded the arms embargo by banning all imports and exports of weapons, excluding small arms (which required Security Council notification).

Member states were also authorised to:

● Inspect North Korea cargo on land, air, and sea, if the state has reason to believe that it contains prohibited items and seize any prohibited materials or technologies

● Prohibit bunkering services for North Korean ships if the state has reason to believe it is carrying illicit cargo

In addition, member states were called upon to:

● Prohibit public financial support for trade with North Korea that would contributed to nuclear, ballistic missile, or WMD-related activities

● Refuse new loads or credit to North Korea, except for humanitarian or development purposes

Resolution 1874’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Resolution 1874 set up a seven-member expert panel to assist the sanctions committee in enforcing the resolution and monitor implementation. Known as the ‘Panel of Experts,’ the group was initially given a mandate for one year and was required to report regularly to the Sanctions Committee on possible violations and recommendations for improving implementation. Later resolutions extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts.

Security Council Resolution 2087

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2087 on January 22, 2013 after a successful North Korean satellite launch on December 12, 2012. The launch was a violation of Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009), which prohibited any further development of technology applicable to North Korea’s ballistic missile programs.

Resolution 2087’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 2087 called for other states to “remain vigilant” in monitoring individuals and entities associated with the North Korean regime. It also directed the sanctions committee to issue an Implementation Assistance Notice if a vessel refused to allow an inspection authorised by its flag state.

Resolution 2087’s Principal Sanctions

Resolution 2087 built on sanctions included in Resolutions 1718 and 1874 including:

● Clarifying the catch-all provision

● Clarifying the state’s right to seize and destroy material suspected of heading to or from North Korea

● Directing the sanctions committee to take action to designate individuals or entities that have assisted in sanctions evasion

Resolution 2087 also listed individuals subject now to the travel ban and asset freeze penalties, and entities subject to the asset freeze penalties, for violations under Resolutions 1718 and 1874.

Resolution 2087’s Monitoring Mechanisms

No new monitoring mechanisms were included in Resolution 2087.

Security Council Resolution 2094

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2094 on March 7, 2013 in response to North Korea’s third nuclear test on February 12, 2013. Resolution 2094’s Principal Provisions

Unlike prior resolutions, 2094 explicitly mentioned North Korea’s uranium enrichment in its condemnation of Pyongyang’s nuclear activities.

Additionally, this resolution

● Expressed concern that North Korea was abusing immunities granted to its diplomats by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations

● Welcomed the Financial Action Task Force’s new recommendation on targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation and urged member states to apply the recommendations

Resolution 2094’s Principal Sanctions

Resolution 2094 expands a number of sanctions measures from earlier resolutions, such as adding nuclear and missile dual-use technologies and luxury goods to the list of banned imports.

Resolution 2094 also designated additional individuals and entities for asset freezes and the travel ban and expanded the designation criteria to include persons or entities suspected of acting on the behalf or controlled by any persons or entities already sanctioned.

The resolution aims to make it more difficult for North Korea to make further progress in its nuclear and ballistic missile programs by hindering its access to hard cash and technological equipment needed to build weapons and pursue uranium enrichment.

The resolution also strengthened the interdiction and oversight authorities for member states by:

● calling for states to inspect and detain any suspected cargo or shipments to or from North Korea that transit through their territory, if the cargo is suspected to contain bulk cash or material that could be used in a nuclear program.

● Directing states to enhance vigilance over North Korea’s diplomatic personnel

New financial sanctions included in the resolution:

● blocked the North Korea regime from bulk cash transfers

● restricted North Korea’s ties to international banking systems

Resolution 2094’s Monitoring Mechanisms

The resolution expanded the panel of experts that assesses implementation of UN Security Council sanctions on North Korea to eight people.

Security Council Resolution 2270

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2270 on March 2, 2016 after North Korea conducted a fourth nuclear test and launched a satellite for the second time. Resolution 2270’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 2270:

● Prohibits states from providing any specialised teaching or training of North Korean nationals in disciplines which could contribute to North Korea’s proliferation.

● Emphasises that the North Korean regime has seriously neglected to meet the needs of the North Korean people and has instead prioritised development of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

● Decides that North Korea shall abandon all chemical and biological weapons and programs and act in accordance with the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention

Resolution 2270’s Principal Sanctions

Resolution 2270 builds upon sanctions measures from prior resolutions, including:

● Expanding the arms embargo to include small arms and light weapons

● Prohibiting North Korea from servicing and repairing any weaponry sold to third parties

● Prohibiting additional luxury goods

Resolution 2270 also expands interdiction and inspection authority for member states to:

● Mandatory inspections on cargo destined to or originating from North Korea

● Asset freeze on all North Korean government and Worker’s Party entities associated with prohibited activities

Resolution 2270 also designated an additional 16 individuals and 12 entitles for asset freezes and travel bans.

New financial sanctions place limits on banking activities of North Korean entities abroad including:

● Prohibiting UN member states from hosting North Korean financial institutions that may be supporting proliferation activities in North Korea

● Prohibiting states from opening new financial institutions or bank branches in North Korea

● Requiring states to terminate existing joint ventures within ninety days of the adoption of the resolution

It also requires that member states repatriate North Korean or other foreign nationals found to be working on behalf of a Security Council resolution-designated entity.

Member states are also prohibited from:

● Chartering or leasing vessels to North Korea, or providing crew services to North Korea or North Korean entities

● Selling or supplying aviation fuel to North Korea so that it cannot be diverted to its ballistic missile program

Resolution 2270’s Monitoring Mechanisms

No new monitoring mechanisms were included in Resolution 2270.

Security Council Resolution 2321

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2321 on November 30, 2016, following North Korea’s fifth nuclear test on September 9. Resolution 2321 significantly expanded sanctions on North Korea.

Resolution 2321’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 2321:

● Calls on all members to reduce the number of staff at DPRK diplomatic missions and consular posts

● Condemns the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons instead of the welfare of its people

● Emphasises, for the first time, the need for the DPRK to respect the inherent dignity of its people in its territory

Resolution 2321’s Principal Sanctions

Resolution 2321 imposed new sanctions that prohibit North Korea from:

● Exporting minerals, such as copper, nickel, silver, and zinc

● Selling statues

● Selling helicopters

● Selling or transferring iron and iron ore, with exceptions for livelihood purposes

● Selling or transferring coal in amounts that exceed a particular cap annually

Member states were also directed to:

● Limit the number of bank accounts held by diplomats and missions

● Suspend scientific and technical cooperation with North Korea, except for medical purposes

Resolution 2321 also added additional items to the list of prohibited dual-use technologies and designated additional individuals and entities subject to asset freezes and the travel ban.

Resolution 2321’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Resolution 2321 introduced a standard notification form for coal purchases from North Korea to track imports against the cap set by the resolution. The resolution also directed the Panel of Experts to hold meetings designed to address regional concerns and build capacity to implement the measures in 2321 and other North Korea sanctions.

Security Council Resolution 2371

Resolution 2371 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on August 5, 2017 in response to North Korea’s two ICBM tests in July. The United States [claimed](https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7924) the new sanctions would prevent North Korea from earning over $1 billion each year, although [some experts](http://www.38north.org/2017/08/jdethomas080717/) expressed doubt.

Resolution 2371’s Principal Provisions

Resolution 2371:

● Regrets North Korea’s massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs

● Reaffirms the Council's support for the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, reiterates its support for commitments made by the Six Parties, and reiterates the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia

● Decides North Korea shall not deploy or use chemical weapons and calls on North Korea to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and comply with its provisions

Resolution 2371’s Principal Sanctions

Resolution 2371 bans the export of several materials, which previous sanctions resolutions had restricted the export of, including:

● Coal

● Iron and iron ore

● Seafood

● Lead and lead ore

The resolution also:

● Adds new sanctions against North Korean individuals and entities, including the Foreign Trade Bank (FTB)

● Prohibits joint ventures between North Korea and other nations

● Allows for the Security Council to deny international port access to vessels tied to violating security council resolutions

● Bans countries from allowing in additional North Korean labourers

Resolution 2371’s Monitoring Mechanisms

Resolution 2371 asks Interpol to publish Special Notices on listed North Koreans for travel bans. It also gives the UN Panel of Exerts additional analytical resources to better monitor sanctions enforcement.

Security Council Resolution 2375

Following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UNSCR 2375 on September 11. The resolution, which primarily targeted North Korean oil imports, textile exports and overseas labourers, contained the strongest yet sanctions against North Korea, according to a U.S. [press release](https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7969). The full text of the resolution is available [here](http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2375).

Resolution 2375’s Principal Provisions

● Reiterates its deep concern at the grave hardship that the people in the DPRK are subjected to, condemns the DPRK for pursuing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles instead of the welfare of its people

● Reaffirms its support for the Six Party Talks, calls for their resumption, and reiterates its support for the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States

Resolution 2375’s Principal Sanctions

Resolution 2375:

● Fully bans textile exports

● Caps refined petroleum product imports at 2 million barrels per year

● Freezes the amount of crude oil imports

● Bans all natural gas and condensate imports

● Prohibits member states from providing authorizations for North Korean nationals to work in their jurisdictions, unless otherwise determined by the committee established UNSCR 1718

● Imposes asset freezes on additional North Korean entities, including the Organisational Guidance Department, the Central Military Commission and the Propagation and Agitation Department

● Directs the 1718 committee to designate vessels transporting prohibited items from North Korea

● Bans all joint ventures or cooperative entities or the expansion of existing joint ventures with DPRK entities or individuals

Resolution 2375 also added additional items to the list of prohibited dual-use technologies and designated additional individuals and entities.

Resolution 2375’s Monitoring Mechanisms

● Provides further guidance for states to conduct interdictions, without the use of force, if the member states have reason to believe the vessel is carrying prohibited cargo.

● If a suspected vessel refuses inspection, the flag state must direct the ship to a port for inspection or risk being designated for an asset freeze or denied port access.

Security Council Resolution 2379

The UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2397 on December 22, 2017 in response to North Korea’s ICBM launch on November 29. The full text of the resolution is available [here](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2397(2017)).

Resolution 2397’s Principal Provisions

● Repeats many of the principles expressed in Resolution 2375

● Acknowledges that North Korean revenue generated by exports and workers overseas contribute to its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs

Resolution 2397’s Principal Sanctions

● Caps North Korean refined petroleum imports at 500,000 barrels per year

● Establishes an annual limit of crude oil imports at four million barrels per year

● Obligates the Security Council to impose additional caps on petroleum imports if North Korea tests another nuclear weapon or ICBM

● Directs countries to expel all North Korean workers immediately, or in two years at the latest

● Bans North Korean exports of food, agricultural products, minerals machinery and electrical equipment

● Bans North Korea from importing heavy machinery, industrial equipment and transportation vehicles

● Designates an additional 16 individuals and 1 entity to the UN sanctions list

Resolution 2397’s Monitoring Mechanisms

● Requires countries to seize and impound ships caught smuggling illicit items, including oil and coal

Post Scriptum: The Chairboard HIGHLY ADVISES all delegates to look, read and understand this document in its entirety. And yes that **does include** past resolutions.

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